Abstract: Instances of password theft are rapidly growing in number. This is sufficient to shake the confidence of the customer in e-commerce. Authenticating the user on insecure communication channel like internet is an essential primitive and is target of various attacks. Therefore, remote user authentication is one of the most essential requirement for ensuring secure communication in today's ubiquitous computing environment. Smart card-based authentication provide multi-factor authentication for accessing web-based applications. In this paper, an efficient password-based remote user authentication scheme using smart card is proposed. The proposed scheme is an improvement of the scheme proposed by Hsiang and Shih in 2009. Proposed scheme is secure against all well known security attacks and has a low computational cost. The security of the proposed protocol depends upon two security parameters which makes difficult for an attacker to launch attacks on the proposed scheme. Moreover, the user and the server agree on the common session key. Afterwards, all the subsequent messages between the user and the server are encrypted with this session key. Therefore, the attacker cannot get any meaningful authentication information from eavesdropping even in insecure communication channel.
security. The proposed protocol provides two-factor authentication based on password and smart card.
The password-based authentication schemes are vulnerable to parallel session, dictionary, man-in-the-middle and insider attacks. Hacking and identity thefts are the two main concerns in password-based authentication protocols. A solution is required in which it is not possible for the attacker to launch different attacks on smart card-based authentication protocol. The aim of this paper is to provide a secure smart card-based password authentication solution for the user authentication. The main feature of the proposed protocol is that the legitimate client can easily login on to the server. The security of the proposed protocol depends upon two security parameters which makes difficult for an attacker to launch attacks on the proposed scheme. Moreover, the user and the server agree on the common session key. Afterwards, all the subsequent messages between the user and the server are encrypted with this session key. Therefore, either the user or the server can retrieve the original message because both of them know the common session key.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the related work in the field of password-based authentication schemes is discussed. A brief review of Hsiang and Shih's (2009) scheme is given in Section 3. Section 4 describes the cryptanalysis of Hsiang and Shih's scheme. In Section 5, an improved scheme is proposed. Formal security model is presented in Section 6. The security analysis of the proposed improved scheme is presented in Section 7. The comparison of the cost and performance of proposed scheme with the other related schemes is shown in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Related work
In 1981, Lamport (1981) proposed a password-based authentication scheme using password tables which was secure against communication eavesdropping and password table disclosure. Since then, a number of remote user authentication schemes have been proposed to improve Lamport's scheme. These proposed schemes pointed out the possible security attacks and weaknesses of Lamport's scheme. In 2000, Hwang and Li (2000) proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in which they had removed the risk of modified password table present in Lamport's scheme. Further, they reduced the cost of protecting and maintaining the password table in their scheme. Hwang and Li's scheme can withstand replay attack and also authenticate the remote users without maintaining a password table.
In 2000, Sun (2000) proposed a smart card-based remote user authentication scheme to improve the efficiency of Li's scheme. In 2002, Chien et al. (2002) proposed a remote user authentication scheme to improve Sun's scheme. They pointed out that Sun's scheme only achieves one way authentication where only the server authenticates the legitimacy of the remote user and not vice versa. They claimed their scheme to be efficient as it does not require password verification table, provides mutual authentication and the user can freely choose his password. In 2004, Ku and Chen (2004) found that Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to insider attack and reflection attack. They proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards which was an improvement of the scheme proposed by Chien et al. In 2004 , Yoon et al. (2004 found that the password change phase of Ku and Chen's scheme is incorrect and the scheme is vulnerable to parallel session attack. So they presented an enhancement to Ku and Chen's remote user authentication scheme. In 2009, Hsiang and Shih (2009) pointed that the scheme proposed by Yoon et al.' s is vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, masquerading attack, password guessing attack and parallel session attack. To preclude the weaknesses of Yoon et al.'s scheme, Hsiang and Shih presented a scheme that enhances the security of Yoon et al.'s scheme. In 2010 , Sood et al. (2010 proposed an improved remote user authentication scheme that inherits the merits of Hsiang and Shih's scheme with improved security. In 2010, Chen et al. (2010) found that the protocol proposed by Hsiang and Shih (2009) is vulnerable to parallel session attack and proposed an improved scheme to counter only the parallel session attack whereas the other security attacks still persisted in the improved scheme. Also in 2010, Yeh et al. (2010) pointed that the protocol proposed by Hsiang and Shih (2009) is also subjected to masquerade attack, offline password guessing attack and undetectable on-line password guessing attack. They proposed an improvement of Hsiang and Shih's scheme and claimed that the scheme is secure against all the security attacks. But their improved scheme inherits the limitation of delayed user verification and impersonation attack. Also, the cost of the scheme is relatively high. In 2010, Li and Hwang (2010) proposed a biometrics-based authentication scheme using smart cards having relatively high computation cost.
In 2009, Wang et al. (2009) proposed a dynamic identity-based remote user authentication scheme and claimed that their scheme is more efficient and secure than other related schemes. However, Khan et al. (2011) found that Wang et al.'s scheme can not preserve user's anonymity during authentication and also vulnerable to insider attack. Moreover, the user is not allowed to choose his password. Also there is no provision for revocation of lost or stolen smart card and does provide session key agreement. To remedy these security flaws, they proposed an enhanced authentication scheme. They claimed their scheme is free from the identified weaknesses of Wang et al.'s scheme and is more secure and efficient for practical application environment. However, Debiao et al. (2010) show that Khan et al.'s (2011) scheme can not protect the user's anonymity. Also there is session-key problem and inefficiency of the double secret keys. In 2012, Madhusudan and Mittal (2012) found that Khan et al.'s (2011) scheme is vulnerable to insider attack and wrong password login attack. In 2012, Wang and Ma (2012) proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Again the communication cost and computation cost of their scheme is quite high as it is based on exponential operations. Therefore, the schemes proposed so far either are subjected to security attacks or they have a high communication cost or both. In this paper, an advanced remote user authentication protocol is proposed which is robust against all the security attacks and certainly has a low communication and computation cost.
Review of Hsiang-Shih scheme
In this section, the remote user authentication scheme proposed by Hsiang and Shih in 2009 is examined. Hsiang and Shih's scheme consists of four phases viz. registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase as summarised in Figure 1 . The notations used in this section are listed in Table 1 . 
Registration phase
In this phase, user U i selects a random number b and computes H (b ⊕ P i ) and submit his identity ID i , H (P i ) and H (b ⊕ P i ) to the server S for registration over a secure communication channel. While registering the user for the first time, the authentication server S creates an entry for U i in its database and stores n = 0 for this user. Otherwise, the server S sets n = n + 1 in the existing entry for the user U i (re-registration in case of lost smart card or stolen smart card). The server S computes EID i = (ID i | n), B i = H (EID i ⊕ x), R i = B i ⊕ H (b ⊕ P i ) and V i = H (B i ⊕ H (P i )). The server S stores n corresponding to ID i in its database. Then, the server S issues the smart card with secret parameters (R i , V i , H ( )) to the user U i through a secure communication channel.
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Step 1 S → U i : smart card (R i , V i , H ( )).
Afterwards, the user U i enters the value of b in his smart card. The smart card now contains security parameters as (R i , V i , b, H ( )) stored in its memory.
Step 2 U i → smart card: b.
Login phase
For login, the user U i inserts his smart card into a card reader to login on to the server S and submits his identity ID i * and password P i * .
Step 1 U i → smart card: ID i * , P i * .
Then, the smart card computes C 1 = R i ⊕ H (b ⊕ P i * ) and C 2 = H (C 1 ⊕ T), where T is current date and time of the input device and sends the login request message (ID i * , C 2 , T) to the service provider server S.
Step 2 Smart card → S: ID i * , C 2 , T.
Authentication phase
The service provider server S verifies the received value of ID i * with the stored value of ID i in its database.
Step 1 S checks ID i * ?= ID i .
Then the server S verifies the validity of timestamp T by checking (T' -T) <= δT, where T' denotes the server's current timestamp and δT is expected time interval for a transmission delay. Afterwards, the server S extracts the value of n corresponding to ID i * from its database to compute EID i = (ID i | n), C 2 * = H (H (EID i ⊕ x) ⊕ T) and compares C 2 * with the received value of C 2 .
Step 2 S checks C 2 * ?= C 2 .
If they are not equal, the server S rejects the login request and terminates this session. Otherwise, the server S acquires the current time stamp T'' to compute C 3 = H (H (EID i ⊕ x) ⊕ H (T'')) and sends the message (C 3 , T'') back to the smart card of the user U i .
Step 3 S → smart card: C 3 , T''.
On receiving the message (C 3 , T''), smart card checks the validity of timestamp T'' by checking (T''' -T'') <= δT, where T''' denotes the client's smart card current timestamp. Then, the client's smart card computes C 3 * = H (C 1 ⊕ H (T'')) and compares it with received value of C 3 .
Step 4 Smart card checks C 3 * ?= C 3 .
This equivalency authenticates the service provider server S and the login request is accepted else the connection is interrupted.
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Password change phase
A user U i inserts his smart card to card reader and enters his identity ID i * and password P i * corresponding to his smart card.
Step 1 U i → Smart Card: ID i * , P i * .
The smart card computes
) and compares the calculated value of V i * with stored value of V i in its memory to verifies the legality of the user U i .
Step 2 Smart card checks V i * ?= V i . Step 3 R i and V i are updated with R i new and V i new respectively.
4 Cryptanlysis of Hsiang-Shih's scheme Hsiang and Shih (2009) claimed that their scheme is secure against various security attacks. But, it has been found that their scheme is susceptible to impersonation attack and offline guessing attack. Also there is a delay in checking the legitimacy of the user U i in the authentication phase. The scheme even fails to preserve the user's anonymity.
Impersonation attack
The attacker can intercept a valid login request message (ID i * , C 2 , T) of the user U i from the public communication channel. Now he can launch offline dictionary attack on C 2 = H (C 1 ⊕ T) to know the value of C 1 , which is always equal to B i . After guessing the value of C 1 , the attacker can frame and send fabricated valid login request message (ID i * , C 2 , T u ) to the service provider server S without knowing the password P i of the user U i , where T u is a current timestamp and C 2 = H (C 1 ⊕ T u ) = H (B i ⊕ T u ). Hence, the attacker can successfully make a valid login request to impersonate as a legitimate user U i to the service provider server S.
Offline guessing attack
A malicious privileged user U i having his own smart card can gather information R i = B i ⊕ H (b ⊕ P i ) and b from his own smart card. He can find out the value of B i as B i = R i ⊕ H (b ⊕ P i ) because the malicious user knows the values of b and his own password P i corresponding to his smart card. Then, this malicious user launches offline dictionary attack on B i = H (EID i ⊕ x) = H ((ID i | n) ⊕ x) to find out the value of x because malicious user knows his identity ID i and value of n. Now this malicious user has intercepted a valid login request message (ID k , C 2 , T) of the user U k from the public communication channel. Now he can launch offline dictionary attack on C 2 = H (
by guessing the value of n (value of n is predictable starting from 0 to some positive integer like 1, 2 or 3) to know the value of C 1 , which is always equal to B k . After guessing the correct value of C 1 , an attacker can frame and send fabricated valid login request message (ID i * , C 2 , T u ) to the service provider server S, where T u is a current timestamp and C 2 = H (B k ⊕ T u ). Hence, the malicious user can successfully make a valid login request to masquerade as a legitimate user U k .
Delayed user verification
The legitimacy of the user U i has not checked in the login phase of Hsiang and Shih's scheme. The authenticity of the user U i being verified by checking the received value of C 2 in the authentication phase. Suppose the attacker gets the smart card of any user, he can flood different login request message to the server S from different card reader machines by submitting any invalid identity and random password. That causes denial of service by the server to other legitimate users. Instead, the legitimacy of the user U i should be checked by the smart card in login phase by computing
) and verifying the calculated value of V i * with stored value of V i in its memory. If both values match, the legitimacy of the user is assured and smart card proceeds to the next step. Otherwise the login request from the user U i is rejected. Afterwards, the smart card computes C 2 = H (C 1 ⊕ T), where T is current date and time of the input device and sends the login request message (ID i * , C 2 , T) to the service provider server S.
User's anonymity
The user U i inserts his smart card into a card reader to login on to the server S and submits his identity ID i * and password P i * . The smart card computes C 1 = R i ⊕ H (b ⊕ P i * ) and C 2 = H (C 1 ⊕ T), where T is current date and time of input device and sends the login request message (ID i * , C 2 , T) to the service provider server S. User's identity ID i * is transferred in clear text during login request message and hence the different login request messages belonging to the same user can be traced out and can be interlinked to derive some information related to the user U i . Hence, Hsiang and Shih's scheme is not able to preserve the user's anonymity.
Proposed protocol
In this section, we propose a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards which resolves the above security flaws of Hsiang and Shih's (2009) scheme. The protocol preserves all the merits of Hsiang and Shih's scheme while eliminating all its weaknesses. Figure 2 presents the protocol structure of our remote authentication scheme. The legitimate user U i can easily login on to the service provider server using his smart card, identity and password. Notations used in this section are listed in Table 1 .
Registration phase
In order to register as a legitimate user U i with the service provider server S, user submits his identity ID i and password P i to the server S via a secure communication channel. The server S computes the necessary security parameters and stores them on the smart card of the user. Then, the server S issues a smart card to the user U i .
Login phase
A user U i inserts his smart card into a card reader machine in order to login on to the server S and submits his identity ID i and password P i . Smart card verifies authenticity of the user and submits client verifier information to the destination server S.
Authentication phase
The service provider server S verifies the authenticity of the user. Once the user is authenticated by the server S then the user and the server agree on the common session key.
Password change phase
The user has to authenticate itself to the smart card before requesting the password change. 
Registration phase
The server S authenticates itself to the user U i using its public key certificate. Then the user U i generates and encrypts the session key (SS) with the public key (PK) of the server S as (SS) PK . The user U i has to submit his identity ID i and password P i to register itself to the server S. Then the identity ID i and password P i of user U i are encrypted with this session key (SS) as (ID i ) SS and (P i ) SS . The user U i submits (SS) PK , (ID i ) SS and (P i ) SS to the server S.
Step 1 U i → S: (SS) PK , (ID i ) SS , (P i ) SS The server S decrypts the session key (SS) using its private key. Thereafter, the server S decrypt the identity (ID i ) SS and password (P i ) SS because now the server knows this common session key (SS). Then server S chooses random nonce value n i and computes the security parameters
The server S selects the value of n i corresponding to each user in such a way that the value of EID i must be unique for each user. The server S stores n i ⊕ x and ID i ⊕ H (n i | x) corresponding to EID i in its database. Then the server S issues a smart card containing security parameters (B i , R i , V i , H ( )) to the user U i through a secure communication channel.
Step 2 S → U i : smart card.
Login phase
A user U i inserts his smart card into a card reader machine to login on to the server S and submits his identity ID i * and password P i * . The smart card computes V i * = H (ID i * | P i * ) ⊕ P i * and compares it with the stored value of V i in its memory to verifies the legality of the user.
Step 1 Smart card checks V i * ?= V i .
After verification, the smart card computes
, where T is current date and time of the input device. Then the smart card sends login request message (CID i , M i , T) to the service provider server S.
Step 2 Smart card → S: CID i , M i , T.
Authentication phase
On receiving the login request from the user U i , the service provider server S checks the validity of timestamp T by checking (T' -T) <= δT where T' is the current date and time of the server S and δT is expected time interval of transmission delay. The server S computes EID i * = CID i ⊕ H (H (x) | T) and finds EID i corresponding to EID i * in its database and then extracts n i ⊕ x and ID i ⊕ H (n i | x) corresponding to EID i * from its database. Now, the server S computes n i from n i ⊕ x because server knows its secret key x. Then, the server S computes ID i from ID i ⊕ H (n i | x) as now the server S knows the value of n i and x. Afterwards, the server S computes M i * = H (EID i | H (x) | H (x | n i ) | T) and compares M i * with the received value of M i .
Step 1 Server S checks M i * ?= M i .
This equivalency authenticates the user U i and the login request is accepted else the connection is terminated. Finally, the user U i and the server S agree on the common session key as S k = H (ID i | H (x | n i ) | H (x) | EID i | T). All the subsequent communication after the session key agreement between the client and the server are XOR ed with the session key S k . Therefore, either the client or the server can interpret the original message because both of them know the common session key S k .
Password change phase
The user U i can change his password without the help of the server S. The user inserts his smart card into a card reader machine and enters his identity ID i * and password P i 
Formal security model
In this section, a formal security model for smart card-based password authentication schemes is described. This model is based on Yeh et al. (2010) , Wang and Ma (2012) , Bellare and Rogaway (1993) , Bellare et al. (2000) and Bresson et al. (2003) security models. The adversary's capabilities are modelled through queries. Thereafter, it is used to check the security of proposed model under the assumptions that the hash function closely behaves like a random oracle. The hash functions used in this paper is modelled as random oracle. The security of the proposed scheme is proved by formalising the notion of security for key agreement and authentication. It is assumed that there is an adversary A, who can do eavesdropping and replay the messages between the user and the server without modifying them. The computation phases are modelled in the authentication as oracles which follow the rules of the protocol, responding to input messages from the adversary. The proposed protocol is secure against all well known attacks described in Section 6 and Section7. The notions used in the paper are described ahead.
Players
Server is denoted by S and a user is denoted by U i that can participate in the authentication protocol P. Each of them may have several instances called oracles involved in distinct and concurrent executions of P. In our proposed scheme, the user U i computes CID i = EID i ⊕ H (H (x) | T) and M i = H (EID i | H (x) | H (x | n i ) | T) and sends it to server S. Suppose the adversary get hold of these parameters, even then adversary has to guess EID i, H (x) and H (x | n i ) correctly at the same time. Suppose the adversary is another legitimate user U K . That means adversary can compute the value of H (x) from his own smart card. Suppose the adversary get hold of smart card of user U i . That means adversary can compute the value of EID i but adversary can not compute the value of H (x | n i ). Suppose adversary applied offline dictionary attack on M i to guess the value of H (x | n i ). There will be more than one value of H (x | n i ) to yield the corresponding value of M i . Even, if adversary computes all such combination of H (x | n i ) to yield the corresponding value of M i . The adversary is not able to find, which guess is the correct one. To check out the correct guess, adversary can try different possible values of H (x | n i ) on agreed session key S k = H (ID i | H (x | n i ) | H (x) | EID i | T) between the user U i and server S. That means adversary must know the identity ID i of user U i . It is already assumed that adversary is having the smart card of user U i and has access to all parameters stored in smart card of user U i . The adversary has to guess ID i on one of these three parameters EID i = H (ID i | H (x | n i )), B i = EID i ⊕ H (x), R i = H (x | n i ) ⊕ H (ID i | P i ) and V i = H (ID i | P i ) ⊕ P i without knowing the correct value of H (x | n i ) and P i . Overall, by getting access of smart card of legitimate user U i and getting security parameter CID i and M i , the adversary has to guess minimum two parameters correctly at the same time. This will further have more than one combination. It will have negligible probability to guess all parameters correctly. This is not feasible in polynomial time and sufficient to frustrate the adversary.
Queries
The interaction between an adversary A and the protocol participants occurs only via oracle queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack scenario. The queries to the oracles are presented as shown ahead.
1 Send (U i , S): The oracles model the transmission of messages which are sent from user U i to server S. When receiving a query, it will return with the randomised massage of U i . This query models an active attack in which the adversary A may send a message to server S and get back the response generated from server S by processing the message according to the protocol P. This query initialises the session key agreement protocol. That means, the adversary receives the flow the user U i should send out to the server S.
4 Execute (U i , S): This oracle query is used to model passive (eavesdropping) attacks of the adversary. The output of this query consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol P.
5 VeriExeute (U i , S): The oracles carry out the honest execution of verification.
6 Test (U i ): This oracle query is not used to simulate the adversary's attack but to define session key's semantic security. Once the verification is successful, a coin is flipped. If it is 1, the secret key or session key will be sent to adversary. Otherwise, if it comes out to be 0, a random key will sent to adversary. This query can be called only once during its execution.
7 Reveal (I): This query models the misuse of session keys. It returns to the adversary the session key S k of participant instance I, if the target instance actually holds a session key. Instance I and its partner S are not asked by a Test query.
8 Corrupt (I): This query models corruption capability of the adversary. Adversary can indeed steal/break either one of the two authentication factors of clients, but not both.
• if a = 1, it outputs the identity ID i and password PW i of user U i
• if a = 2, it outputs parameters, i.e. (B i , R i , V i , H ( )) stored in the smart card
• if a = 3, it outputs the private key x of server S.
The security of proposed protocol is modelled via the following game between a challenger C (user U i ) and an adversary A. The registration phase is activated by C. The adversary A who is given the corresponding public parameters of U i and S and has accesses to both U i and S's oracles as well as any random oracles in the game. After executing the interactive computation with the oracles of the authentication, A may make a polynomial number of queries in a security parameter k. If b = 0, then U i randomly chooses a session key S k and outputs it. Otherwise, if b = 1, it outputs its own session key. After that, A can continue querying the oracles except that A cannot reveal or corrupt the test oracle or its partner (if it exists). Finally, A outputs a guess b i for b. The probability that A can do a correct guess is negligible, hence the scheme is secure. Algorithm 1 shows an adversary A which intends to attack the authentication protocol.
Algorithm 1
For adversary A 1 Execute the Send (U i , S), Send (S, U i ), also the query Login (U i , S) if necessary.
2 Send the Execute (U i , S) and VeriExeute (U i , S) to the oracles to execute the verification.
3 Execute the Test (U i ) Query.
4 Output the guess bit b, if b is correct, the adversary wins.
It is easy to see that, the above oracle queries indeed can model all the adversary capabilities but can not compute the session key.
Partnering
We define partnering by using the notion of session identifier sid. Let U i and S j be a pair of instances. We say that the instances U i and S j are partnered if both instances have accepted and both instances shared the same sid. Also the partner identifier (pid) of U i is S and vice-versa. In general, we let sid be the ordered concatenation of all messages sent
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and received by the instance U i (or Sj). Message transmitted in one session by user U i is valid for that session only. Hence, it can not be used for authentication in any other session.
Freshness
The freshness means that a session key can not be trivially known to the adversary. An instance I is fresh if it has accepted and computed a session key. Neither I nor its partner has been asked for a Reveal query. At most one kind of Corrupt query is made to the client involved (either I or its partner) and no Corrupt query is made to the server involved (either I or its partner), since the beginning of the game.
Correctness
If U i and S j are partnered and they are accepted, then they end up with the same session key (Sk u ) i = (Sk s ) j .
Authentication
Main aim of the authentication schemes is to prevent the adversary from impersonating as user U i or the server S. The user U i and the server S agree on the common session key
. It is not possible for the adversary to guess multiple parameters ID i , H (x | n i ), H (x) and EID i correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Moreover, adversary A can exhaustively search the correct (ID i , PW i ) pair in an offline manner on parameter V i = H (ID i | P i ) ⊕ P i , once the adversary obtains the smart card of user U i . Since the adversary can get the value of V i from the smart card of user U i . There are more than one pairs of (ID i , PW i ) which yields the correct value of V i . That will frustrate the adversary. There is no other way than launching an online password guessing attack to determine the exactly correct one. If adversary A gets the correct pair of (ID i , PW i ), even then the adversary has to guess EID i and H (x | n i ). There is a possibility that adversary gets the smart card of user U i and hence can extract EID i . But adversary has to launch dictionary attack to get the value of H (x | n i ). There will be more than one value of H (x | n i ) that yields correct value of R i . Hence, guessing all those parameters correctly at the same time in real polynomial time will frustrate the adversary.
Semantic security
Another major concern of authentication schemes with key agreement is to protect the privacy of the session key. In an execution of protocol P, an adversary A can ask a polynomial number of Execute query, Reveal query, Corrupt query, Login query and Send query. It can also ask a single Test query to a fresh instance. The protocol P is semantically secure because any polynomial time (PPT) adversary A's advantage is negligible in the security parameters.
Theorem:
The countermeasure in Section 6 and Section 7 is secure under collision resistance of the hash function.
Proof: The challenger C runs copies of user U i and server S internally and holds some oracles to model the registration phase, login phase and verification phase. Before sending the Test (U i ), A can use the queries above for many times. Finally, A sends the test query Test (U i ) to the oracle modeling the authentication protocol of the challenger, the oracle outputs S k according to coin flipping. A send a Test (U i ) query, the coin flipping is executed and if the coin b = 1, the oracle outputs a fresh a, if the coin b = 0, the oracle return a randomise string which is at the same length of a. The adversary has to output one bit to guess the answer to the query Test (U i ). However, due to the security of the hash function, the adversary cannot distinguish S k = H (ID i | H (x | n i ) | H (x) | EID i | T) from a randomly generated string. Hence, the probability of A's successful attack is negligible. Note that the S k is a fresh one and independent from the previous session. A has to output one bit b. If b i = 1 for multiple bits of session key, then it output the correct session key
. If b i = 0 for multiple bits of session key, then it output a random string. The adversary cannot distinguish a random string from a valid session key S k with non-negligible probability due to collision resistance of the hash function used in our proposed scheme. Hence, the probability of A's successful attack is negligible. Hence, theorem is proved.
Security analysis
Smart card is a memory card that has an inbuilt micro-processor and memory. When the user wants to access the required web service, he inserts his smart card into the card reader machine which performs the necessary cryptographic operations specified in the protocol. Some of these parameters are even stored in the memory of the smart card for identifying the legitimate user of the web service after the initial registration process. Kocher et al. (1999) and Messerges et al. (2002) pointed out that the information stored on the smart card can be forged by the malicious users by using certain reverse engineering techniques such as monitoring the power consumption of smart card. This means that once a smart card is stolen by an attacker, he can extract the information stored in it and launch various security attacks. Therefore, a good password authentication scheme should insure user's identity and protection from different feasible attacks. The scheme proposed in this paper provides key security features and is secure against all the feasible attacks as presented in this section.
1 Identity protection: The proposed protocol provides identity protection as instead of sending the real identity ID i of the user U i in authentication phase, the unique pseudo identification CID i = EID i ⊕ H (H (x) | T) is generated for each new session by the smart card corresponding to the legitimate user U i for its authentication to the server S. Thus when this information travels over an insecure network, the original identity ID i always remain encapsulated in the security parameter CID i and cannot be forged by the attacker.
2 Brute force attack: In order to launch brute force attack, the attacker first obtains the security parameters
and then tries to guess the value of EID i , H (x | n i ) and H (x). It is not possible to guess two parameters correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against brute force attack.
3 Impersonation attack: In this type of attack, the attacker impersonates as a legitimate user and forges the authentication information obtained from the authentication protocol. Then the attacker attempts to modify a login request message (CID i , M i , T) into (CID i * , M i * , T * ), where T * is the attacker's current date and time, in order to authentication as a legitimate user U i . However, such a modification will fail in Step 1 of the authentication and session key agreement phase because an attacker has no way of obtaining the values of ID i , H (x) and H (x | n i ) to compute the valid parameters CID i * and M i * . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against impersonation attack.
4 Stolen smart card attack: In case the smart card of a legitimate user's is stolen by the attacker, he can extract the information stored in its memory. The attacker can extracts B i = EID i ⊕ H (x), R i = H (x | n i ) ⊕ H (ID i | P i ) and V i = H (ID i | P i ) ⊕ P i from the memory of smart card. Even after gathering this information, the attacker has to guess both the parameters ID i and P i correctly at the same time. It is not possible to guess out two parameters correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against stolen smart card attack.
5 Offline dictionary attack: In offline dictionary attack, the attacker can record messages and attempt to guess the user's identity ID i , password P i and other secret parameters from recorded messages. The attacker first tries to obtain the user U i 's verification CID i = EID i ⊕ H (H (x) | T), M i = H (EID i | H (x) | H (x | n i ) | T), T and then try to guess the values of ID i , H (x) and H (x | n i ) by offline guessing. Even after gathering this information, the attacker has to guess all three parameters ID i , H (x) and H (x | n i ) correctly at the same time. It is not possible to guess all three parameters correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. In another case, the attacker requires valid smart card of the legitimate user and then has to guess the identity ID i and password P i correctly at the same time. It is not possible to guess two parameters correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against offline dictionary attack.
6 Malicious server attack: A malicious privileged authentication server S can monitor the authentication process of the user U i and can gather information related to the user U i . The malicious server S can gather information, CID i = EID i ⊕ H (H (x) | T) and M i = H (EID i | H (x) | H (x | n i ) | T) during the login phase corresponding to the legitimate user U i . In proposed protocol, the malicious server cannot compute ID i , P i , H (x) and H (x | n i ) from EID i = H (ID i | H (x | n i )), B i = EID i ⊕ H (x), R i = H (x | n i ) ⊕ H (ID i | P i ) and V i = H (ID i | P i ) ⊕ P i corresponding to user U i . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against malicious server attack.
7 Denial of service attack: In this type of attack, an attacker by obtaining the smart card of the user updates password verification information on smart card to some arbitrary value. Hence, the legitimate user U i cannot login successfully in subsequent login request to the server. In our proposed protocol, smart card checks the validity of user identity ID i and password P i before password update procedure. An attacker inserts the smart card into the card reader machine and has to guess the identity ID i and password P i correctly corresponding to the user U i . Since the smart card computes V i * = H (ID i * | P i * ) ⊕ P i * and compares it with the stored value of V i to verify the legitimacy of user U i before the smart card accepts the password update request. But, is not possible to guess out identity ID i and password P i correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against denial of service attack. is not known to malicious user U i even after getting the smart card of user U K . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against malicious user attack.
10 Replay attack: In this type of attack, the attacker first listen to communication between the client and the server and then tries to imitate user to login on to the server by resending the captured messages transmitted between the client and the server. Replaying a login request message (CID i , M i , T) of one session into another session is useless because the client's smart card uses current time stamp value T in each new session, which makes all the parameters CID i and M i dynamic and valid for small interval of time. Old messages can not be replayed successfully in any other session and hence the proposed protocol is secure against message replay attack.
11 Leak of verifier attack: In this type of attack, the attacker can the steal verification table from the server. If the attacker steals the verification table from the server, he can use the stolen verifiers to impersonate a participant of the authentication protocol. In the proposed protocol, the service provider server S knows secret x and stores n i ⊕ x and ID i ⊕ H (n i | x) corresponding to EID i in its database. The attacker does not have any technique to find out the value of x and hence can not calculate n i from n i ⊕ x and ID i from ID i ⊕ H (n i | x). In case verifier is stolen by breaking into smart card database, the attacker does not have sufficient information to calculate the
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user's identity ID i and password P i . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against leak of verifier attack.
12 Server spoofing attack: In server spoofing attack, the attacker can manipulate the sensitive data of legitimate users via setting up fake servers. In the proposed protocol, malicious server can not compute the session key S k = H (ID i | H (x | n i ) | H (x) | EID i | T) because the malicious server does not know the value of ID i , H (x | n i ), H (x) and EID i . Moreover, the session key is different for the same user in different login sessions. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against server spoofing attack.
13 Online dictionary attack: In this type of attack, the attacker pretends to be the legitimate client and attempts to login on to the server by guessing different words as password from a dictionary. In the proposed protocol, the attacker has to get the valid smart card and then has to guess the identity ID i and password P i corresponding to user U i . Even after getting the valid smart card by any mean, it is not possible to guess identity ID i and password P i correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against online dictionary attack.
14 Parallel session attack: In this type of attack, the attacker first listens to communication between the client and the server. After that, he initiates a parallel session to imitate legitimate user to login on to the server by resending the captured messages transmitted between the client and the server with in the valid time frame window. He can masquerade as legitimate user by replaying a login request message (CID i , M i , T) within the valid time frame window. The attacker cannot compute the agreed session key H (ID i | H (x | n i ) | H (x) | EID i | T) between the client and the server because the attacker does not know the values of ID i , H (x | n i ), H (x) and EID i . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against parallel session attack.
15 Man-in-the-middle attack: In this type of attack, the attacker intercepts the messages sent between the client and the server and replay these intercepted messages with in the valid time frame window. The attacker can act as the client to the server or vice-versa with recorded messages. In the proposed protocol, the attacker can intercept the login request message (CID i , M i , T) from the client to the server S, which is sent by a valid user U i to the server S. Then he starts a new session with the server S by sending a login request by replaying the login request message (CID i , M i , T) within the valid time frame window. The attacker can authenticate itself to the server S but cannot compute the agreed session key S k = H (ID i | H (x | n i ) | H (x) | EID i | T) between the client and the server because the attacker does not know the values of ID i , H (x | n i ), H (x) and EID i . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attack.
16 Message modification or insertion attack: In this type of attack, the attacker modifies or inserts some messages on the communication channel with the hope of discovering the client's password or gaining unauthorised access. Modifying or inserting messages in the proposed protocol can only cause authentication between the client and the server to fail but cannot allow the attacker to gain any information about the client's identity ID i and password P i or gain unauthorised access. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against message modification or insertion attack.
Table 2
Cost comparison among related smart card-based authentication schemes Table 3 Functionality comparison among related smart card-based authentication schemes Low communication and computation cost is an important aspect of any efficient authentication scheme. The performance comparison of the proposed scheme with the relevant smart card-based authentication schemes is summarised in Table 2 . The identity ID i , password P i , b, x, n i and timestamp values all are assumed to be 128-bit long. The output of secure one-way hash function is also assumed to be 128-bit. Let T H and T X denote the time complexity for hash function and XOR operation respectively. The relationship between the time complexity associated with these operations is T H >> T X . In the proposed scheme, the parameters stored in the smart card are B i , R i , V i and the memory needed (E1) in the smart card is 384 (= 3 * 128) bits. The communication cost of authentication (E2) includes the capacity of transmitting message involved in the authentication scheme. The capacity of transmitting message {CID i , M i , T} is 384 (= 3 * 128) bits. The computation cost of registration (E3) is the total time of all operations executed in the registration phase. The computation cost of registration is 5T H + 5T X . The computation cost of the user and the service provider server is the time spent by the user and the service provider server during the process of authentication. Therefore, the computation cost of the user (E4) is 5T H + 4T X and that of the service provider server (E5) is 5T H + 3T X . The functionality comparison of the proposed scheme with the relevant smart card-based authentication schemes is summarised in Table 3 . The proposed scheme requires nearly the same computation as required by Hsiang and Shih scheme but it is highly secure as compared to the related schemes.
Conclusions
Smart card-based authentication is one of the most convenient ways to provide multi-factor authentication for accessing web-based applications. Corporate network and e-commerce applications require secure and practical remote user authentication solutions. With the increase in the rate of cyber crime over past few years, user find it difficult to vest their confidence in internet-based web services. In such a scenario, smart cards provide an ideal solution because of its inherent confidentiality, portable size and intelligent computing capability. In this paper, we presented a cryptanalysis of Hsiang and Shih's scheme which was based on smart cards and showed that their scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack and offline guessing attack. Their scheme also delays the checking of legitimacy of the user to authentication phase and even fails to preserve the user anonymity. An enhancement to Hsiang and Shih's scheme is proposed that inherits the merits of Hsiang and Shih's scheme and precludes various possible security attacks. The proposed protocol is robust and efficient because only one-way hash function and XOR operations are used in its implementation. This protocol can be easily integrated into different types of services such as banking and enterprise applications.
